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Background: Impulsivity is currently more commonly regarded as multifaceted, comprising both motor and cognitive
subdomains. However, it is less clear how distinct these subdomains are, and the extent to which they interact and
draw upon the same psychological resources.Methods: The present experiment comprised 70 regular (non-problem)
gamblers, and investigated the potential to induce impulsivity transfer effects within an electronic gambling context.
Original and existing harm-minimization approaches were tested for their efﬁcacy in inducing motor cautiousness
during an electronic slot machine simulation. Participants were exposed to a forced discriminatory motor choice
procedure, or pop-up responsible gambling messages that either contained emotive or non-emotive responsible
gambling content. The subsequent impact these interventions had on delay discounting and reﬂection impulsivity was
also measured using the 27-item Monetary Choice Questionnaire and Information Sampling Task, respectively.
Results: Findings demonstrated that only original harm-minimization approaches, which force the gambler to engage
in discriminatory motor choice procedures during gambling, were successful in inducing motor cautiousness.
However, both the discriminatory choice procedure and emotive message harm-minimization approaches were
successful in facilitating cognitive choice, even though the emotive message intervention was unsuccessful in
facilitating motor response inhibition, suggesting both an indirect motor cautiousness route, and a more direct route to
improved cognitive choice during gambling. Conclusion: This study demonstrated that decision-making during
gambling can be improved by making simple structural changes to slot machine platforms, by encouraging active
engagement in motor processes, which result in a transfer of cautiousness to wider cognitive domains.
Keywords: executive control, gambling, impulsivity, harm minimization, motor cautiousness
INTRODUCTION
Impulsivity has been deﬁned as behavior characterized by
little or no forethought, reﬂection, or consideration of the
consequences (van den Bos, 2007). Several research studies
have noted that the construct of impulsivity should be
considered multifaceted, comprising subdomains represent-
ing distinct processes (for a review, see Arce & Santisteban,
2006). A number of scholars (e.g., Bechara, 2002; Bechara,
Damasio, & Damasio, 2000) make the distinction between
motor impulsivity and cognitive/choice impulsivity. Motor
impulsivity, which refers to action without thinking (Kocka
& Gagnon, 2014), is considered the antithesis of motor
response inhibition, typically assessed using the Go/No-Go
Task, although it can also be assessed with the Continuous
Performance Test (e.g., Holmes et al., 2002) and the Stop
Signal Task (e.g., Ávila, Cuenca, Félix, Parcet, & Miranda,
2004). Motor impulsivity is usually associated with disrup-
tion to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Bechara et al.,
2000). For example, individuals with frontal cortex lesions
are more likely to display risky and more impulsive behav-
ior when it is contextually inappropriate (Duncan, 1986;
Shallice, 1982). Brain stimulation studies utilizing techni-
ques, such as transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS),
show that similar patterns of behavior are found in healthy
individuals when these brain regions are stimulated
(e.g., Chambers et al., 2006; Verbruggen, Aron, Stevens, &
Chambers, 2010).
Cognitive impulsivity is considered the inability to weigh
the consequences of immediate and future events, with higher
levels of cognitive impulsivity being associated with an
inability to delay gratiﬁcation (Arce & Santisteban, 2006).
Cognitive impulsivity is typically assessed with approaches
including the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara, Damasio,
Damasio, & Anderson, 1994), as well as experimental delay
discounting tasks (Matta, Gonçalves, & Bizarro, 2012),
including the Monetary Choice Questionnaire (MCQ;
Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999). Although still associated with
prefrontal cortex regions in the brain, lesion studies suggest
that the ventromedial region of the prefrontal cortex is the
main area involved in cognitive impulsivity (Bechara, 2002).
More recent research into human impulsivity has resulted
in an increased understanding of the neurobiological
mechanisms involved in impulsivity, leading to the view
that impulsivity is not a unitary construct. However, while
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psychopathological research has identiﬁed distinctions
between impulsive choice and action in disorders including
attention-deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; Solanto
et al., 2001) and substance abuse (Broos, Diergaarde,
Schoffelmeer, Pattij, & De Vries, 2012; Diergaarde et al.,
2008), there is also evidence suggesting a considerable
overlap between neurotransmitter systems and brain regions
involved in impulsive choice and impulsive action
(Chambers, Garavan, & Bellgrove, 2009; Peters & Buchel,
2011). This brings into debate the degree to which these two
constructs are distinct. The aims of this study were therefore
to assess the nature of this relationship between impulsive
choice and action within a gambling context, with a view to
assessing the impact of gambling harm-minimization tools
in reducing levels of impulsivity displayed by gamblers
within a gambling session.
Evidence for distinction and overlaps between impulsive
choice and impulsive action
Broos, Schmaal, et al. (2012) examined the relationship
between impulsive choice and impulsive action among 101
healthy university student participants. They compared
within-participant delay discounting (impulsive choice)
with performance on a modiﬁed continuous performance
task (immediate and delayed memory task) and a Stop
Signal Task (impulsive action). Performance on these
behavioral tasks was also compared with self-report impul-
sivity using the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11;
Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995). Results showed that the
immediate and delayed memory task performance correlated
positively with each other, but there was no correlation
between performance on these tasks assessing impulsive
action with delay discounting rates in the delayed discount-
ing task assessing impulsive choice. In addition, there was
only a weak correlation between the delayed memory task
and Stop Signal Task performance. Furthermore, BIS-11
scores failed to correlate signiﬁcantly with any of the
behavioral measures of impulsivity. Their results suggest
that impulsive choice and impulsive action are largely
unrelated in healthy adults.
However, contemporary neuroscience research offers an
alternative account of the relationship between impulsive
action and impulsive choice. For example, Knoch et al.
(2006) used TMS to demonstrate that when the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex – an area associated with the suppression of
impulsive motor actions (Bogacz, Wagenmakers, Forstmann,
& Nieuwenhuis, 2010) – is disrupted from normal function-
ing, it leads to increased risk-taking within a gambling
context. Such results have led to arguments that controlling
impulses across a variety of domains including suppression of
thoughts, decisions, and actions, relies on overlapping inhib-
itory control networks. However, direct evidence is rare
because the empirical ﬁndings are typically correlational in
nature (Verbruggen, Adams, & Chambers, 2012).
Studies have directly compared the neural components
active in a range of tasks assessing self-control and the
suppression of impulsive choice and action (for a review,
see Cohen & Lieberman, 2010). Such studies typically
compare motor response inhibition performance with other
forms of self-control, utilizing measures such as the Flanker
Task, which requires the suppression of distracting infor-
mation (Bunge, Dudukovic, Thomason, Vaidya, & Gabrieli,
2002; Wager et al., 2005), and the Wisconsin Card Sorting
Test, which assesses set-shifting and perseverance (Konishi
et al., 1999). Combined neuroimaging techniques typically
show that the right inferior frontal cortex and/or right
anterior insula are active during inhibition trials within such
tasks, regions that are associated with response inhibition in
experiments utilizing Go/No-Go and Stop Signal paradigms
(Bunge et al., 2002; Wager et al., 2005). Such studies
indicate that various forms of self-control – a construct
viewed as the antithesis of impulsivity (Bickel et al., 2012) –
share underlying neural components.
Muraven and Baumesiter (2000) conducted a series of
studies requiring participants to complete tasks involving
various aspects of self-control, including the suppression of
impulsive motor actions in a Stop Signal Task, as well as
tasks requiring suppression of thoughts, emotions, and
temptation. Participants who were asked to perform a
second impulse control task generally performed worse on
that task than participants who were initially asked to
complete an effort-matched task not requiring self-control.
These results are explained using a shared resources account
of self-control, suggesting that self-control is not only a
uniﬁed process, but that various aspects of self-control are
derived from a limited resource that is prone to fatigue
effects.
Impulsivity transfer effects within a gambling context
Within a gambling context, Verbruggen et al. (2012) dem-
onstrated that participants encouraged to exercise response
inhibition and monitor their motor actions demonstrated a
preference for less risky gambling choices in a novel
gambling task. Requiring participants to exercise a degree
of motor cautiousness in the presence of potential stop
signals resulted in participants making gambling-related
decisions that were less risky. In addition, participants spent
more time making decisions as indicated by longer choice
latencies. This line of research was later extended by
Stevens et al. (2015) who examined whether the relationship
between motor cautiousness and monetary decisions was
driven by changes in arousal and/or perceptual processing
style. The results showed that inducing motor cautiousness
with the presence of stop signals resulted in participants
selecting smaller and less risky betting choices, but that the
relationship was not mediated by the stop signals adjusting
the perceptual processing pattern assessed using eye tracker
technology, nor was the effect mediated by the stop signals
adjusting participant’s arousal levels, as assessed using skin
conductance responses. One explanation for these transfer
phenomena offered by Stevens et al. (2015) is that the
presence of stop signals adjusted the hedonic and motiva-
tional value of subsequent gambling-related stimuli, and is
consistent with Dickinson and Dearing’s (1979) suggestion
of an antagonistic appetite and aversive center within the
brain. One key limitation of these ﬁndings is that they were
based on a novel gambling procedure that does not replicate
a typical gambling product structure. In addition, the pro-
cedure that is used to assess the choice component of
impulsivity, while having real-world application, is not a
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recognized and standardized test of impulsive choice, mak-
ing the ﬁndings difﬁcult to compare with wider research
assessing the relationship between different aspects of
impulsivity.
The potential for impulsivity transfer effects within
a gambling context provides the opportunity for harm-
minimization approaches that are designed to facilitate
motor response inhibition to also inﬂuence a gambler’s
wider decision-making capacity within a gambling session.
Although research has provided competing views regarding
the relationship between subcomponents of impulsivity,
neurobiological and behavioral evidence suggests that there
are both distinct and shared mechanisms involved within
different aspects of impulsivity (Chambers et al., 2009).
Relevance to the present study
If a link exists between impulsive action and impulsive
choice, then it may be possible to positively inﬂuence the
choice component of impulsivity by inducing a more
cautious motor response style. From a gambling harm-
minimization perspective, it is important that any proposed
approach be tested for unintentional perverse effects. For
example, evidence suggests that different aspects of self-
control rely on a shared pool of resources (Muraven &
Baumesiter, 2000), meaning that the application of motor
control during gambling could negatively affect perfor-
mance on choice impulsivity tasks via fatigue effects.
Research aims and hypotheses
The ﬁrst aim of the experiment was to experimentally assess
if inducing motor cautiousness during a slot machine gam-
bling simulation would result in a cautiousness transfer
effect to performance on choice impulsivity tasks. The range
of aforementioned evidence from neuroscience and behav-
ioral studies demonstrates signiﬁcant overlaps between
impulsive action and impulsive choice, both within and
outside of a gambling context. This led to the hypothesis that
inducing motor cautiousness during slot machine gambling
will result in less impulsive performances on subsequent
choice impulsivity tasks (H1).
If inducing a less impulsive and more controlled motor
response style within a gambling context has an impact on
choice impulsivity, it should also intuitively follow that
inducing a rapid and highly impulsive motor response style
could also inﬂuence decision-making style on choice im-
pulsivity tasks. The second research aim of the experiment
was therefore to examine the impact of inducing a rapid
motor response style during slot machine gambling on
subsequent performance on impulsive choice tasks. It was
hypothesized that inducing a rapid motor response style
during a slot machine gambling simulation would result in
greater levels of impulsivity being demonstrated in subse-
quent impulsive choice tasks (H2).
The third aim of the experiment was to assess the efﬁcacy
of new and existing harm-minimization tools in facilitating
more cautious decision-making during a gambling session.
It was hypothesized that harm-minimization tools successful
in reducing impulsive actions would lead to reduced levels
of impulsive choice (H3).
METHODS
Design
A between-participants experiment was conducted to assess
the impact of new and existing gambling harm-minimization
tools on impulsivity transfer effects. An electronic slot
machine simulator was designed using a combination of
the graphical user interface and coding function available on
the Psychopy experiment builder (Peirce, 2007; Figure 1).
Behavioral measures of response inhibition were built into
the slot machine simulator, and following each session of
gambling, participants were given various online psycho-
metric scales to complete to assess subjective arousal,
dissociation, valence, and perceived self-control. All scales
were presented and completed using the Psychopy experi-
ment builder. Reaction time was also measured, which is a
standard function in the experimental software. Choice
impulsivity tasks were then conducted using the same
computer platform, in the form of a 27-item MCQ (Kirby
et al., 1999) and Information Sampling Task (IST; Clark,
Robbins, Ersche, & Sahakian, 2006; Parke, Harris, Parke, &
Goddard, 2015).
Participants
A sample of 70 (n= 53 males) non-problem, regular gam-
blers were recruited from amusement arcades and sports
clubs in the Lincolnshire areas of the UK. These areas were
targeted during the recruitment process as they were identi-
ﬁed as areas likely to contain a high density of gamblers. All
participants were classed as regular gamblers, deﬁned for
the purposes of this study as an individual who had gambled
at least once per month in the past 12 months. Participant’s
mean age was 31.14 years (SD = 10.90), with ages ranging
from 18 to 60 years. A short screening questionnaire was
administered to ensure that participants: (a) reported regular
participation in gambling and (b) had never suffered from a
gambling problem or were currently suffering from a gam-
bling problem. An afﬁrmative answer on either count of
Figure 1. EGM simulator screenshot. A three-reeled slot machine
simulator with a single pay line was designed using the Psychopy
experiment builder. The machine is activated using the space bar
on the participant’s keyboard when the visual display spin button
changes from gray to either green or red (although participants are
instructed to withhold responses when the button is red)
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problem gambling resulted in participants being excluded
from participation. Consequently, ﬁve participants were
excluded from participation following the screening ques-
tionnaire, as they were found to have previously experi-
enced problem gambling.
Materials
Behavioral Response Inhibition Task. The electronic game
machine (EGM) simulator consisted of 90 trials (gambling
events) per condition. The EGM was activated by pressing
the “spin button,” which was the space bar on a standard
computer keyboard. The spin button on the EGM simula-
tor’s visual display varied in color from green to red, with
green trials indicating participants could spin the reels and
continue gambling, but red indicating that they need to
withhold their motor response. Response inhibition was
therefore measured with an “online” behavioral Go/No-Go
Task, because the task was embedded into the EGM simu-
lator. The ﬁrst 30 trials of each condition were all green “go”
responses, often referred to as a “training phase” in response
inhibition tasks (e.g., Verbruggen et al., 2012). The purpose
of the ﬁrst 30 trials all being “go” trials was to allow any
prepotent patterns of motor responses to develop. The
remaining 60 trials in each condition consisted of a ran-
domized 4:1 ratio of green “go” and red “no-go” trials.
The Go/No-Go Task. This task is considered to be the
gold-standard measure of motor inhibition (Arce &
Santisteban, 2006). In comparison to other experimental
paradigms that measure motor inhibition, the Go/No-Go Task
is simple to administer and understand, and it can be used
with varying types of stimuli, including both verbal and non-
verbal variants, as well as providing multiple behavioral data
to assist the examination of processes that may be involved
in response inhibition (e.g., reaction time). Moreover, the
Go/No-Go Task has been widely used as a measure of motor
impulsivity in a wide variety of domains and settings within
the ﬁeld of psychology (e.g., Langley et al., 2004; Matthews,
Simmons, Arce, & Paulus, 2005; Rosello, Munar, Justo, &
Arias, 1998; Spinella, 2004).
Jacobs’ 4-item Measure of Dissociation. Dissociation in
a gambling context can be characterized as absorption in the
game where thoughts of personal well-being are laid to one
side and gamblers seem no longer aware of other events
going on around them (Delfabbro, 2006). One of the
potential uses for pop-up responsible gambling messages,
such as those tested within the present experiment, is to
interrupt these dissociative states that can be experienced by
gamblers. Therefore, dissociation represents a psychological
construct that may shed light on the relationship between
responsible gambling tools, motor impulsivity, and choice
impulsivity. Dissociative experience was measured in this
study using a modiﬁed version of Jacobs’ 4-item Measure of
Dissociation (Kuley & Jacobs, 1988). The original scale was
modiﬁed in two ways for this study. First, the original four
items were modiﬁed to ask participants to reﬂect on the
gambling session they had just participated in, as opposed to
gambling experience in general. For example, the question
“When gambling, how often do you feel like you have been
in a trance?” was modiﬁed to read “Thinking back to the
gambling session you have just completed, how often did
you feel like you were in a trance?” The second modiﬁcation
of the scale was the addition of a ﬁfth item, asking parti-
cipants about their perception of time during the gambling
session, an item incorporated into previous experimental
gambling research (Blaszczynski, Cowley, Athony, &
Kinsley, 2016; Gupta & Derevensky, 1998). All ﬁve items
were self-reports on a 5-point Likert scale, anchored at 1
(“never”) and 5 (“all the time”). Midpoint of the scale (“3”)
indicated “occasionally.”
Self-assessment manikin (SAM). Participant’s subjective
levels of arousal and valence during each experimental
condition were assessed using the SAM (Lang, 1980). The
SAM is a non-verbal pictorial assessment technique that
directly assesses the pleasure and arousal associated with an
individual’s affective reaction to a wide variety of stimuli
(Figure 2). The SAM was chosen to assess valence and
arousal, because it is a method that has been demonstrated as
an easy way to administer, non-verbal method for quickly
assessing the arousal, and pleasure associated with an
individual’s reaction to an event or stimuli. SAM scores
measuring experience of arousal are highly correlated with
scores obtained using verbal and lengthier semantic differ-
ential scales (Bradly & Lang, 1994). They have also been
used to assess emotional responses to a wide range of
stimuli, including both pictures (e.g., Lang, Greenwald,
Bradly, & Hamm, 1993) and sounds (e.g., Bradly, 1994),
and successfully administered among a range of clinical
populations, as well as children and non-English speakers
(Bradley & Lang, 1994). Full body versions of the SAMs
were used for both the valence and arousal scale (portrait-
only versions are available for the valence scale, in which
Figure 2. Arousal (top) and valence (bottom) of self-assessment manikins
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only a close up of the manikin face is presented), and both
scales were presented in their 9-point scale versions
(Figure 2).
Choice impulsivity measures
Delay discounting. The 27-item MCQ is a delay discounting
task where participants have to choose between a smaller
immediate hypothetical monetary reward, or a larger but
temporally delayed reward. The questionnaire varies in both
the amount of hypothetical money on offer, as well as the
hypothetical temporal delay between the immediate and
delayed reward. Each question was presented individually
on a computer screen. The left-hand side of the screen always
read “Would you prefer £x today” and the right-hand screen
always read “or £x in x days,” where the delayed reward was
always higher in value. Participants made their choices by
pressing the corresponding number next to the two options,
“1” for the immediate reward and “0” for the delayed reward.
These numbers were spatially related to the options on screen.
This was also done to minimize erroneous key presses,
because they appeared on opposite ends of the number scale
on the keyboard. An overall preference for immediate reward
over larger but delayed rewards has been reliably shown to
indicate higher levels of choice impulsivity (Anokhin,
Golosheykin, & Mulligan, 2015).
Reﬂection impulsivity. The IST is a measure of reﬂection
impulsivity. The IST in the present experiment was a
modiﬁed version of the IST developed by Clark et al.
(2006). The original IST was a grid of 5 × 5 covered boxes
that contained one of two unseen colors, and participants
were required to sequentially select a box to reveal the color
underneath the cover. Participants were required to identify
which of the two colors would be in the majority when all
boxes were uncovered.
In this study, the IST was modiﬁed to be more represen-
tative of a familiar probability task, and was based upon the
classic “Urn Problem” (see Parke et al., 2015 for use of this
task in a gambling context). The urn contained 19 unseen
balls, and each ball was colored black or red. Participants
were required to determine whether red or black balls within
the urn were in the majority. Participants were able to gather
information by selecting to remove a ball from the urn to
reveal its color. Points were awarded in the IST for correct
predictions regarding which color was in the majority. For
each IST trial, participants began with 95 points, and had
ﬁve points removed for each ball taken from the urn. For
example, if a participant removed three balls from the urn,
and correctly predicted that red was in the majority they
would win 80 points for that IST trial. However, if parti-
cipants made an incorrect prediction, then they would be
ﬁned 100 points for that trial. Participants were informed
that all of the points that they accumulated over the IST trials
would be totaled, and the top ﬁve participants who accu-
mulated the most points would receive a £50 shopping
voucher as a prize.
During the experiment, participants were not provided
with feedback regarding whether their predictions in each
IST trial were correct. This is also a modiﬁcation on classic
ISTs, because feedback on correct/incorrect responses is
normally provided following each trial. Because this study
wanted to control for valence as a covariate, it was decided
that no feedback would be given following each trial to
prevent emotional carryover contamination effects (i.e., to
prevent the results from one trial changing the emotional
state of the participant in later trials which may have the
undesirable effect of facilitating or impeding performance).
As a result of this control, any differences in performance
across conditions can be more conﬁdently attributed to the
experimental manipulations.
Reﬂection impulsivity was assessed by observing three
component variables: Mean Information Sampled, Mean
Response Latency, and Mean Probability of Making Correct
Decisions (p-correct). Mean Information Sampled referred
to the mean average number of balls removed from the urn
for each IST trial, and the Mean Response Latency refers to
the mean amount of time taken to make a decision to remove
another ball or to make a prediction of which color was in
the majority. Mean Probability of Making Correct Decisions
(p-correct) referred the probability of the participants’ color
predictions being accurate, based on the available informa-
tion at the time the decision was made (Clark et al., 2006;
Parke et al., 2015).
Procedure
Each participant was randomly assigned to gamble on a
three-reeled EGM simulator in one of ﬁve conditions: no
intervention (control condition), emotive pop-up message
intervention, informative pop-up message intervention,
structure change intervention, and a double-response con-
dition. Participants were provided with £9 to gamble with
(10p per spin) and were told that any money they had left at
the end of the experiment could be kept. The event frequen-
cy of the slot machine simulator was 1.5 s, because this
speed has been shown to be the most problematic for
exercising response inhibition in a previous experiment by
the present authors (names removed for blind review). Each
slot machine condition was programmed to give the illusion
of randomness. However, the slot machines were pre-
programmed to control for volume, frequency, and range
of wins, as well as number of near misses (Clark, Lawrence,
Astley-Jones, & Gray, 2009). The slot machine pay back
percentage was 90%, although participants were allowed to
keep the full £9 as a compensation for their time, but they
were not informed of this until the end of the experiment.
Participants were given a tutorial on how to operate the
EGM simulator, and were informed of what each of the
visual display features was, including the pay-line, credit
balance, and win totals on winning spins. A pay-out struc-
ture was also shown to participants during the tutorial,
showing how much money would be won for speciﬁc
matching symbols (Figure 3). Participants were instructed
to only operate the machine by pressing the spin button
(space bar on standard computer keyboard) when the spin
button on the visual display was green in color, and
instructed they must withhold from pressing the spin button
when it was red in color. The slot machine was programmed
to spin automatically on “no-go” trials after a delay equiva-
lent to one event frequency (1.5 s). The ﬁrst 30 trials of each
slot machine condition were all “go” trials, and the remain-
ing 60 trials consisted of a 4:1 ratio of “go” to “no-go” trials.
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Structure change condition
With the exception of the structure change condition and
double-response condition, the EGM simulator was operat-
ed by pressing the space bar on a standard keyboard when
the spin button was green in color on the visual display.
However, in the structure change condition, the operation of
the EGM simulator consisted of pressing either the left
arrow key or the right arrow key, depending on the image of
the black directional arrow displayed within the green spin
button on the visual display. During the double-response
condition, participants were instructed to press the spin
button (i.e., space bar) twice in rapid succession to operate
the machine, inducing a rapid response style.
Pop-up message intervention
In both pop-up message intervention conditions, a pop-up
message appeared on screen for 30 s after the 30th trial. The
message could not be skipped, and gambling could only
continue once the message had been on screen for 30 s.
Depending upon the condition, the message either displayed
general information about potential dangers relating to
gambling, or displayed emotional content related to poten-
tial familial and ﬁnancial consequences related to reckless
gambling (Figure 4). Following each gambling condition,
participants were asked to complete the arousal SAM,
valence SAM, Dissociative Experience Scale, and single-
item measure of perceived self-control, in that order. All
scales were completed online immediately following the
gambling simulation in each condition.
The choice impulsivity tasks followed the completion of
the various scales, separated by a message that appeared on
screen for 5 s informing participants that the cognitive
choice tasks were about to start. All ﬁve IST trials were
presented ﬁrst, each with a different combination of pre-
programmed to-be-removed red and black balls, and ﬁnally,
participants completed the 27-item MCQ online.
Ethics
Before commencement of the study, the study was approved
by the research team’s University Ethics Committee. The
study protocol was designed in accordance with guidelines
of the Declaration of Helsinki. Participants were fully
briefed and instructed on how to complete both tasks prior
to the beginning of the experiment and provided their
informed consent to participate in the study. Participants
were informed that all the data were conﬁdential and
anonymous.
RESULTS
BIS-11 and age controls
Mean participant trait impulsivity scores were assessed
using the BIS-11 (Patton et al., 1995). A between-
participants analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed that
participants’ overall BIS-11 scores [F(4, 69)= 0.149,
p= .963], including the second-order factors motor impul-
sivity [F(4, 69)= 0.801, p= .529], attentional impulsivity
[F(4, 69)= 0.924, p= .455], and non-planning impulsivity
[F(4, 69)= 0.141, p= .966], did not differ between groups
to a statistically signiﬁcant degree. In addition, a between-
participants ANOVA showed that participants’ mean
ages did not differ to a statistically signiﬁcant degree
between experimental groups [F(4, 69)= 0.348, p= .844].
Figure 3. EGM simulator pay-out structure. Participants were
provided with the pay-out structure information during the tutorial.
Each number is a multiple of one credit, with one credit being
equal to 10p. Therefore, prizes for winning symbols ranged from
20p to £10
Figure 4. Emotive pop-up message (left) and informative message (right). Pop-up message was presented after 30 gambling trials,
interrupting play for 30 s before allowing the gambling simulation to continue
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Therefore, differences in the dependent variables assessed at
the group level throughout the experiment can be more
conﬁdently attributed to the experimental manipulations, as
opposed to participant preexisting levels of trait impulsivity
and/or age effects. All means and standard deviations for the
BIS-11 and age values are shown in Table 1.
Arousal
A one-way between-participants ANOVA showed a
non-statistically signiﬁcant effect of intervention on mean
participant reported levels of arousal [F(4, 69)= 0.867,
p= .489, η2= 0.05]. The results also showed that mean
arousal ratings in all conditions, which were conducted at
fast gambling speeds, were moderately high. Mean arousal
ratings in all conditions were above six on the 9-point scale,
with a grand mean of 6.39 (SD= 0.98), conﬁrming the
subjectively arousing experiencing of the gambling simula-
tion conducted at a high event frequency (Table 2).
Dissociation
A one-way between-participants ANOVA showed that
mean levels of dissociation experienced by the participants
did not vary to a statistically signiﬁcant level between
groups [F(4, 69)= 0.336, p= .852, η2= 0.02]. Overall,
dissociation levels in all conditions while gambling at fast
speeds of play were very low, with grand mean dissociation
levels (7.00, SD= 1.53) falling close to the bottom end of
the possible range of scores (5–25). All dissociation means
and standard deviations are reported in Table 2.
Valence
A one-way between-participants ANOVA showed that dif-
ference in mean valence ratings between conditions did not
vary to a statistically signiﬁcant degree [F(4, 69)= 0.257,
p= .904, η2= 0.02]. In all conditions, mean valence ratings
were above the midpoint of the 9-point scale (grand mean=
5.79, SD= 1.07), indicating that on average, participants
found the gambling experience overall moderately pleasur-
able, and that none of the harm-minimizations interventions
had deleterious effects on the emotional experience during
the gambling simulation. All valence means and standard
deviations are reported in Table 2.
Reaction time
A one-way between-participants ANOVA showed that the
difference in mean reaction times between conditions was
statistically signiﬁcant [F(4, 69)= 13.09, p< .001, η2=
0.45]. The fastest mean reaction time was found in the
double-response condition (0.56 s, SD= 0.09). Bonferroni
pairwise comparisons showed that this mean reaction time
was statistically signiﬁcantly faster when compared to the
control condition (0.72 s, SD = 0.12, p= .01, d= 1.51),
emotive message condition (0.71 s, SD= 0.13; p= .022,
d= 1.34), informative message condition (0.70 s, SD=
0.13, p= .031, d= 1.25), and structure change condition
(0.90 s, SD= 0.14, p< .001, d= 2.89). The slowest mean
reaction time was found in the structure change condition,
which was statistically signiﬁcantly slower than the control
condition (p= .004, d= 1.38), emotive message condition
Table 1. Participant’s means (and standard deviations) of age and BIS-11 scores across experimental conditions
Condition
Variable
BIS-11 non-planning BIS-11 motor BIS-11 attention BIS-11 overall Age
Control (CONT) 21.57 (3.34) 21.28 (3.20) 16.79 (2.15) 59.64 (7.02) 33.79 (13.25)
Structure change (STRU) 21.35 (3.00) 21.21 (2.78) 16.86 (1.83) 59.43 (5.32) 30.71 (9.83)
Emotive message (EMOT) 20.92 (2.84) 20.21 (2.78) 16.78 (2.08) 57.93 (6.39) 29.07 (11.62)
Informative message (INFO) 21.14 (3.59) 20.50 (3.65) 17.21 (2.72) 58.86 (8.65) 30.43 (10.40)
Double-response (DOUB) 21.64 (21.64) 22.07 (2.73) 15.57 (3.13) 59.29 (4.77) 31.71 (10.13)
Note. No statistical signiﬁcance was found between-groups for all variables. BIS-11: Barratt Impulsiveness Scale.
Table 2. Means (and standard deviations) of arousal, valence, dissociation, reaction time, and response inhibition scores across
experimental conditions
Condition
Dependent variable
Arousal
(1–9)
Valence
(1–9)
Dissociation
(5–25) Reaction time (s)
Response inhibition
(% successfully inhibited)
Control 6.29 (1.33) 5.57 (1.16) 7.29 (1.77) 0.72 (0.12) 66.67 (12.23)
Structure change 6.43 (0.51) 5.50 (1.09) 6.71 (1.38) 0.90 (0.14) 83.93 (10.57)
Emotive message 6.14 (0.95) 5.42 (1.02) 7.21 (1.72) 0.71 (0.13) 69.05 (11.05)
Informative message 6.29 (1.07) 5.71 (1.20) 6.86 (1.41) 0.70 (0.13) 67.86 (14.57)
Double-response 6.79 (0.89) 5.79 (0.97) 6.93 (1.49) 0.56 (0.09) 57.14 (12.17)
Note.Only differences in mean reaction time and response inhibition scores reached statistical signiﬁcance (p< .001). Statistically signiﬁcant
Bonferroni comparisons: Reaction Time – DOUB<CONT, STRU, EMOT, INFO. STRU>CONT, EMOT, INFO, DOUB. Response
Inhibition – STRU>CONT, EMOT, INFO, DOUB. CONT: control; STRU: structure change; EMOT: emotive message; INFO: informative
message; DOUB: double-response.
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(p= .002, d= 1.41), informative message condition (p= .001,
d= 1.48), and the double-response condition (p< .001,
d = 2.89). There was neither statistically signiﬁcant differ-
ence between mean reaction time in the emotive message
and control conditions, the informative message and con-
trol conditions, nor between the emotive and informative
message conditions. Therefore, the results indicate that
only the structure change condition was successful in
slowing participant’s mean reaction times when compared
to a control group, whereas inducing a rapid response style
with the double-response condition sped up participant’s
mean reaction time.
Response inhibition performance
A one-way between-participants ANOVA showed that the
difference in mean response inhibition performance between
conditions was statistically signiﬁcant [F(4, 69)= 8.71,
p< .001, η2= 0.35]. Performance was highest in the structure
change condition (83.93%, SD= 10.57). Bonferroni pairwise
comparisons showed that this mean response inhibition
performance in the structure change condition was statis-
tically signiﬁcantly higher when compared to the control
condition (66.67%, SD= 12.23, p= .004, d= 1.51), emotive
message condition (69.05%, SD= 11.05, p= .02,
d= 1.38), informative message condition (67.86%,
SD= 14.57, p= .009, d= 1.26), and double-response condi-
tion (57.14%, SD = 12.17, p< .001, d = 2.35). While
performance was lowest in the double-response condition,
pairwise comparisons failed to show this mean performance
was statistically signiﬁcantly worse than the control, emotive
message, or the informative message conditions. All other
pairwise comparisons showed non-statistically signiﬁcant
results. On the whole, only the structure change condition
facilitated response inhibition performance relative to a con-
trol condition, and worked signiﬁcantly better when com-
pared to the emotive and informative message interventions.
Inducing a rapid response style using the double-response
condition resulted in the worst response inhibition perfor-
mance overall, but this failed to reach statistical signiﬁcance.
Information Sampling Task
p-correct. The main variable of interest regarding reﬂection
impulsivity, as measured by the IST, was the probability of a
participant being correct at the time of making a decision,
which is referred to as p-correct. p-correct was calculated
using the following formula (Clark et al., 2006; Parke et al.,
2015):
PðCorrectÞ=
P
z
k−A

z
k

2z
,
where z= 19 – (number of balls removed from the urn), and
A= 13 – (number of balls removed of selected color).
A one-way between-participants ANOVA showed a statis-
tically signiﬁcant difference between mean p-correct scores
across conditions [F(4, 69)= 7.41, p< .001, η2 = 0.31].
Bonferroni pairwise comparisons showed that participants
in the emotive message condition (84.49%, SD= 3.71,
p= .024, d= 0.61) and structure change condition
(85.93%, SD= 2.67, p= .008, d= 1.22), had statistically
signiﬁcantly higher p-correct values when compared to the
control group (82.40%, SD= 3.11). However, there was no
statistically signiﬁcant difference between mean p-correct
scores in the emotive message and structure change condi-
tions. The p-correct values for the informative message
(81.88%, SD= 2.91) and double-response (80.72%, SD=
4.21) conditions did not differ signiﬁcantly when compared
to a control group. Performance was signiﬁcantly worse in
the double-response condition when compared to the emo-
tive message (p= .003, d= 0.95) and structure change
(p= .001, d= 1.47) conditions. Performance was also sig-
niﬁcantly worse in the informative message condition when
compared to the structure change condition (p= .02,
d= 1.45), but the difference in mean p-correct values
between the informative message and emotive message
conditions just failed to reach statistical signiﬁcance at the
p< .05 level (p= .054, d= 0.78). Therefore, the results
indicate that the use of a structure change intervention and
emotive message intervention is able to facilitate probabi-
listic decision-making during gambling, when compared to
a control group. The use of a structure change intervention
also facilitated performance above that of an informative
message intervention, while the trend in the data suggest
emotive messaging also facilitated performance above that
of an informative message intervention, and the p value just
failed to reach statistical signiﬁcance.
Response latency
The mean time that took participants to arrive at a decision in
the IST was compared across conditions using a one-way
between-participants ANOVA. Results showed that the dif-
ference in means was statistically signiﬁcant [F(4, 69)= 7.37,
p< .001, η2= 0.31] Bonferroni pairwise comparisons
showed that only the mean time taken in the structure change
(9.19 s, SD= 2.78, p= .027, d= 1.20) and emotive message
conditions (9.76 s, SD= 3.22, p= .005, d= 1.30) differed
from the control condition (5.93 s, SD= 2.65) to a statistically
signiﬁcant level, where participants took signiﬁcantly more
time to make a decision. Signiﬁcantly less time was taken to
make a decision in the double-response condition (5.19 s,
SD= 2.28) compared to the emotive message condition
(p< .001, d= 1.64) and the structure change condition
(p= .003, d= 1.57). All other pairwise comparisons failed
to reach statistical signiﬁcance at the p< .05 level.
Information sampled
Mean information sampled refers to the mean number of
balls removed (i.e., sampled) from the urn during the IST,
before a decision on predicted majority color was made. The
results from the one-way between-participants ANOVA
showed a signiﬁcant difference between the mean amount
of information sampled across conditions [F(4, 69)= 7.40,
p< .001, η2= 0.31]. Bonferroni pairwise comparisons
showed that when compared to a control group (3.51 s,
SD= 1.21), only the mean amount of information sampled
in the structure change condition (5.14 s, SD= 1.28) dif-
fered to a statistically signiﬁcant level (p= .012, d= 1.31),
where participants on average sampled more information
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before making their decision. Signiﬁcantly more informa-
tion was sampled in the structure change condition when
compared to the informative message (3.51 s, SD = 1.32;
p= .012, d= 1.25) and double-response conditions (2.96 s,
SD= 1.22, p< .001, d= 1.74). More information was sam-
pled in the emotive message condition (4.76 s, SD= 1.33)
compared to the double-response condition (p= .004,
d= 1.41). All other pairwise comparisons showed a non-
statistically signiﬁcant resulting at the p< .05 level. All
mean scores and standard deviations relating to the IST can
be found in Table 3.
27-item Monetary Choice Questionnaire
K-value. Data of one participant assigned to the double-
response condition were excluded from analysis due to an
overall response consistency of 59% on the MCQ, indicative
of potential random response choices. This ﬁgure of 59% is
adequately lower than the 75% response consistency sug-
gested by Kaplan, Lemley, Reed, and Jarmolowicz (2014) for
meaningful analysis and therefore the data were removed,
leaving 69 participants for this section of data analysis. Of
note, three other participants, all in separate conditions, had
an overall response consistency score of 70.37%. While this
falls marginally below the recommended 75% for inclusion,
given the relatively modest number of participants in each
group and the fact that these participants only fell marginally
below the recommended threshold of consistency for one
subcategory of delay period (i.e., large, medium, or short
delay period), their data were retained for analysis.
The k-value is an estimate of discounting rate demonstrat-
ed by the participant, and the possible k-values, as assessed by
the 27-item MCQ, ranging from 0.00016 and 0.25, where a
larger value represents a steeper discounting rate indicative of
greater levels of choice impulsivity. A one-way between-
participants ANOVA showed that the difference in overall
mean k-values across conditions reached statistical signiﬁ-
cance [F(4, 68)= 7.30, p< .001, η2= 0.31]. Bonferroni
pairwise comparisons showed that relative to the control
condition (0.137, SD= 0.085), only the emotive message
condition (0.027 s, SD= 0.041, p= .003, d= 1.65) and struc-
ture change condition (0.052 s, SD= 0.086, p= .043, d=
0.99) had k-values that differed to a statistically signiﬁcant
degree, where k-values were signiﬁcantly lower indicating
greater tolerance for reward delay. The highest overall
k-value was found in the double-response condition
(0.155, SD= 0.081), which was statistically signiﬁcantly
higher than both the emotive message (p< .001, b= 1.99)
and structure change conditions (p= .007, b= 1.23), as well
as the informative message condition (0.068, SD= 0.076,
p= .039, b= 1.11), but was not statistically signiﬁcantly
higher when compared to the control condition. All other
pairwise comparisons of means failed to reach statistical
signiﬁcance. Table 3 summarizes performances on the
choice impulsivity tasks across the experimental conditions.
DISCUSSION
In support of the empirical ﬁndings from the second experi-
ment, only the structure change condition resulted in
improved response inhibition performance relative to a
non-intervention control condition. In support of H1, parti-
cipants in the structure change condition on average also
demonstrated the highest p-correct values on the IST, where
they also sampled more information before making a deci-
sion and demonstrated more deliberation over their decision,
as demonstrated by longer choice latencies. Participants in
the structure change condition also had a statistically sig-
niﬁcantly lower k-value on the MCQ when compared to the
control condition, indicating a greater tolerance for larger
delayed reward. The data therefore suggest that inducing
motor cautiousness during EGM gambling has beneﬁcial
transfer effects that also reduce impulsive choice tendencies.
The fastest reaction times during gambling were found in
the double-response condition, where reaction times were
statistically signiﬁcantly shorter when compared to all other
conditions including the control condition. The worst per-
formance on the motor response inhibition task, IST (in
terms of lowest mean p-correct value), as well as highest
k-value on the MCQ, was also found in the double-response
condition, indicating that inducing rapid and impulsive
motor responses is associated with impaired cognitive
choice. However, differences in the percentage of success-
fully inhibited motor responses, p-correct scores, and
k-values between the double-response and control condition
just failed to reach statistical signiﬁcance, meaning full
support for H2 was not obtained.
Table 3. Mean (and standard deviation) of IST and MCQ values across experimental conditions
Condition
Dependent variable
IST choice latency (s) IST balls sampled (1–19) IST p-correct MCQ k-value
Control 5.93 (2.65) 3.51 (1.21) .82 (.03) 0.14 (0.09)
Structure change 9.19 (2.78) 5.14 (1.28) .86 (.03) 0.05 (0.09)
Emotive message 9.76 (3.22) 4.76 (1.33) .85 (.04) 0.03 (0.04)
Informative message 6.84 (2.83) 3.51 (1.32) .82 (.03) 0.07 (0.08)
Double-response 5.19 (2.28) 2.96 (1.22) .81 (.04) 0.15 (0.08)
Note. Group comparisons for all variables reached statistical signiﬁcance (p< .001). Statistically signiﬁcant Bonferroni comparisons: IST
choice latency – STRU, EMOT>CONT, DOUB. STRU> INFO. IST balls sampled – STRU>CONT, INFO, DOUB. EMOT>DOUB.
IST p-correct – STRU, EMOT>CONT, DOUB. STRUC> INFO. MCQ k-value – STRU, EMOT<CONT, DOUB. DOUB> EMOT,
INFO. CONT: control; STRU: structure change; EMOT: emotive message; INFO: informative message; DOUB: double-response; IST:
Information Sampling Task; MCQ: Monetary Choice Questionnaire.
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Notably, IST p-correct scores were also statistically
signiﬁcantly higher in the emotive message condition com-
pared to the control condition, as well as k-values on the
MCQ in the emotive message condition being statistically
signiﬁcantly lower when compared to the control condition.
Given the fact that the emotive message intervention failed
to facilitate motor response inhibition means that increased
motor cautiousness, while beneﬁcial for cognitive choice in
this gambling simulation, is not an essential factor in
improving information sampling and delay discounting
performance during gambling. Therefore, only partial sup-
port for H3 was obtained. This is because while structure
change approaches that reduced impulsive action also re-
duced impulsive choice, the emotive message condition
failed to reduce impulsive action and yet was able to reduce
impulsive choice. Importantly, these group level differences
in motor and cognitive performances cannot be attributed to
baseline levels of trait impulsivity, given the lack of statis-
tically signiﬁcant differences in participant BIS-11 scores
between experimental groups.
The ﬁndings of this study support existing evidence from
neuroscience (Knoch et al., 2006), neuroimaging (Bunge
et al., 2002; Wager et al., 2005), and behavioral approaches
(Muraven & Baumesiter, 2000; Verbruggen et al., 2012)
that demonstrate signiﬁcant overlaps between impulsive
action and impulsive choice. Although the relationship
between these constructs has received less attention in
gambling, existing work exploring this relationship within
a gambling context found that forcing gamblers to exercise
greater caution over motor responses resulted in a preference
for smaller and lower risk wagers in a novel gambling task
(Verbruggen et al., 2012). This study extends these ﬁndings
to a more realistic gambling activity and demonstrates that
inducing motor cautiousness within slot machine gambling
reduces impulsive choice tendencies. To the authors’ knowl-
edge, this is also the ﬁrst empirical study to directly assess
the efﬁcacy of gambling harm-minimization tools in induc-
ing motor cautiousness, and the impact this has on reﬂection
impulsivity and delay discounting.
Evidence for direct and indirect inﬂuence on impulsive choice
The ﬁndings of this study suggest that a gambler’s level of
impulsive choice during gambling can be positively inﬂu-
enced via multiple processes. There is evidence for an
“indirect” route, in which decision-making is shaped via
a motor cautiousness transfer effect. There is also evidence
that decision-making during gambling is inﬂuenced via a
more “direct” route, whereby the presentation of messages
containing responsible gambling information cause a gam-
bler to reﬂect more carefully upon their decisions. The
efﬁcacy of responsible gambling messages in this direct
process appears dependent upon the type of information
delivered through the pop-up message, because levels of
impulsive choice were signiﬁcantly reduced only when
emotive content was presented to the participant.
Indirect cautiousness transfer account
Arousal is a non-cognitive factor that has been shown to be
inﬂuenced by the presence of cues requiring the withholding
of motor responses (e.g., Jennings, van der Molen, Brock, &
Somsen, 1992; van Boxtel, van der Molen, Jennings, &
Brunia, 2001). However, like the study carried about by
Stevens et al. (2015), there was no evidence in this gambling
simulation to suggest that the association between motor
cautiousness and cognitive choice in the structure change
condition was due to subjective changes in arousal, given
the non-signiﬁcant change in arousal across all experimental
conditions. Subjective arousal ratings in this study thus
appear to corroborate ﬁndings from biological assessment
of arousal that also shows no relationship between arousal
and impulsivity transfer effects (e.g., Stevens et al., 2015).
There was also a lack of evidence to suggest that the
association between increased motor cautiousness and cog-
nitive choice was a result of the structure change condition
reducing the level of dissociation experienced by partici-
pants, nor was there evidence to suggest the association was
related to changes in emotional valence.
Several studies suggest an association between
withholding/cancelling motor responses in Go/No-Go and
Stop Signal paradigms with subsequent approach behaviors
(Houben & Jansen, 2011; Lawrence, Verbruggen, Morrison,
Adams, & Chambers, 2014; Veling, Aarts, & Stroebe,
2013). Being forced to exercise caution over motor
responses in the structure change condition may have
stimulated aversive centers in the brain, which are postulat-
ed by Dickinson and Dearing (1979) to act antagonistically
with appetitive or approach centers. These authors also
argue that the perceived affective dimension of a stimulus
determines subsequent approach or avoidance behavior.
Consistent with this notion, but outside of a gambling
context, Dickinson and Balleine (2002) described an exper-
iment in which inducing aversive defensive eye-blinks
suppressed appetite jaw movements in rabbits. Furthermore,
with human participants, Jones et al. (2011) demonstrated
that cautiousness in a motor inhibition task using neutral
stimuli resulted in reduced alcohol consumption in a later
alcohol taste test, and was argued to be the result of the
presence of stop signals stimulating the aversive/avoidance
system within the brain.
Therefore, exercising motor control appears to have
carryover effects to impulsive choice tasks, where partici-
pants are primed toward a more cautious decision-making
style, where risk is valued as less desirable. This translated
in this study as a willingness for participants in the structure
change condition to make decisions on the IST based on
more information (i.e., more balls removed from the urn and
thus less uncertainty in decision-making) and taking more
time to arrive at a decision as to the majority ball color, as
well as being more tolerant of reinforcement delays in the
MCQ.
Direct cautiousness transfer account
Participants exposed to the emotive message intervention
had p-correct scores in the IST and k-values in the MCQ
comparable to participants in the structure change condition.
Given the fact that response inhibition performance for
participants in the emotive message condition showed no
improvement relative to a control condition, this rules out a
motor cautiousness transfer effect being responsible for the
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improved performance on the cognitive choice tasks in this
condition. Pop-up messages have been argued to encourage
responsible gambling behavior by increasing a gambler’s
self-awareness over their behavior and engage gamblers in
self-appraisal of that behavior (Monaghan, 2008). This
appeared to be effective post-gambling on subsequent cog-
nitive choice tasks, but had no impact on response inhibition
during the gambling simulation in this study and is consis-
tent with results from the second experiment.
One potential explanation for this is that pop-ups become
effective during periods of time that allow for deliberation
and reﬂection to occur. The rapid speed of play of slot
machine gambling may override the effect of the pop-up
message resulting in a lack of improved response inhibition
during the slot machine gambling. It was only following the
end of the gambling simulation that the effects of pop-up
message exposure were evident. Arguably, the subsequent
cognitive choice tasks were an example of a situation
that encouraged deliberation, and this was therefore a situa-
tion in which the cognitive effects of the pop-up message
exposure had opportunity to inﬂuence decision-making.
Only the message containing emotive content (i.e., a warning
of the potential familial and ﬁnancial consequences of a
loss of control during gambling) was effective as a harm-
minimization approach. Non-emotive message content
appeared to fail to inﬂuence decisions, emphasizing the
notion that the type of content displayed in pop-up messages
is vital for their effectiveness as a harm-minimization tool.
Argument for shared mechanism of change
The positive impact of the emotive pop-up message on
decision-making has been referred to here as a “direct”
cautiousness transfer effect. The impact of the emotive pop-
up message intervention on cognitive choice appears inde-
pendent of a motor cautiousness effect, and can be regarded
as a direct impact on decision-making. However, the impact
of the structure change condition on decision-making has
been referred to as an “indirect” transfer effect, because
changes in structure appear to impact motor response pro-
cesses that subsequently and indirectly transfer to wider
aspects of decision-making involved in the cognitive choice
tasks. It may be the case that there is a shared mechanism
underlying both the direct and indirect pathways postulated
here. Both the need to exercise greater caution over motor
responses in the structure change condition, and the presen-
tation of negative consequences associated with loss of
control via the emotive pop-up message condition possibly
reduce the hedonistic and motivational value of subsequent
risk in favor of a more cautious and risk-averse approach.
This potential explanation is consistent with Dickinson and
Dearing’s (1979) proposal of an antagonistic appetitive and
aversive system within the brain.
Caveats
One of the limitations of this study is that the results can
only be assumed to apply to healthy, non-problem gamblers.
For example, problem gamblers have been shown to fail to
properly activate inhibitory control networks within the
brain and poor inhibition of prepotent responses has been
associated with reduced capacity to remain abstinent fol-
lowing outpatient treatment for pathological gambling
(Brevers et al., 2012). As a result, the effectiveness of
implicating structural changes to gambling products to
promote cautious motor responses remains unclear for
problem gambling groups, which represents an important
area of future research. One assumption made by the
screening questions to check for current or previous periods
of problem gambling is that participants had an absence of
problem gambling symptomology. However, problem gam-
bling severity lies along a continuum and therefore those
participants who may be considered as low- or even mod-
erate-risk problem gamblers may have gone undetected by
the simple screening procedure, if the participant did not
consider milder issues as problematic.
Furthermore, those with gambling-related issues may not
have been aware that they had a problem. Use of a scale
sensitive to these subcategories of problem gambling sever-
ity, such as the Problem Gambling Severity Index, could
shed light on how these subgroups are inﬂuenced by the
harm-minimization approaches investigated in this study.
However, it is not the intention of this study for these
successful harm-minimization approaches to help cure prob-
lem gambling in isolation. Instead, the intention is to help
the much larger majority of gamblers who gamble without
problems to remain in control during gambling and mini-
mize the potential for harm caused by speciﬁc structural
characteristics of gambling products (Harris & Grifﬁths,
2018). However, this does not rule out the potential for
future research to investigate how approaches encouraging
motor cautiousness could have potential clinical utility
alongside other treatment approaches for problem gamblers.
Although the participants were screened for problem gam-
bling behavior, there is a range of potential behavioral and
clinical factors not screened that may drive the group-level
differences in impulsivity found in the between-
participant design. Although baseline levels of impulsivity
were controlled across groups according to BIS-11 scores
(which include measures of secondary factors including motor
impulsivity), participants were not matched on response
inhibition according to performance on impulsivity task per-
formance outside of a gambling context. In addition, data
pertaining to potential clinical problems were not obtained
from participants. For example, ADHD, other impulse and
compulsive control disorders, as well as other addictions
represent underlying issues that could impact group-level
differences for motor and choice impulsivity measures found
in this study, particularly given the relatively small number of
participants (n= 14) in each of the ﬁve conditions.
Although to the authors’ knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study
to assess impulsivity transfer effects using widely used cog-
nitive measures within a gambling simulation, it is not clear-
cut as to how decisions in the cognitive choice tasks translate
to real-world gambling-related decisions. It would be difﬁcult
to argue against the notion that making probabilistic decisions
based on more information and increased deliberation time
have advantages within a wide range of disciplines, including
gambling. In addition, preferences for larger delayed rewards
over immediate but smaller reward are advantageous from a
utility perspective. What is required is follow-up research
assessing how these positive decision-making features relate
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to within- and between-gambling session factors, including
loss-chasing behavior, monetary spend during gambling, time
spent gambling, and gambling frequency.
CONCLUSIONS
This experimental investigation using regular non-problem
gamblers demonstrated that structural modiﬁcations to slot
machine gambling can impact executive control domains,
including motor response inhibition and delay discounting,
as well as information sampling. These effects were found
to be independent of trait impulsivity. There was also
evidence that inducing motor cautiousness by forcing
gamblers to discriminate between motor responses had
positive indirect transfer effects to wider aspects of cogni-
tive choice, suggesting impulsive choice and impulsive
action have related underlying processes. The use of
emotive content in pop-up messages directly facilitated
decision-making in cognitive choice tasks, although this
effect was independent of a motor cautiousness transfer
account. Furthermore, these direct and indirect effects
appeared independent of subjective changes in arousal,
dissociation, and valence. Inducing motor cautiousness
during gambling appears to have global beneﬁts for self-
control and has the potential to assist healthy gamblers
avoid behaviors that may lead to risky gambling practices.
Consequently, future research should assess how inducing
motor cautiousness transfers to speciﬁc gambling factors
such as time and monetary spend, and loss chasing beha-
viors, as well as the impact of inducing motor cautiousness
during slot machine gambling on gamblers with varying
degrees of problem gambling severity.
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